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1INTRODUCTION
In the early 1970s, a few years after Yolanda Bejarano began selling fruit 
in Puebla’s downtown streets, she met “El Botas,” a student at the state 
university who was helping vendors organize. They began dating and fell 
in love. The young couple had a baby, but soon after, El Botas disengaged 
from his parental responsibilities. Bejarano became a single mother, selling 
wares with her son by her side. To this day she keeps photographs of the 
boy playing on top of the wooden cart she used to transport and display 
her merchandise. When the police arrived and tried to prevent vendors 
from selling in public spaces, Bejarano, like many peddlers, could quickly 
pull the cart, loaded with fruit and her child, and flee. Tired of evading 
the police and losing merchandise, she became a leading union organizer 
among her fellow vendors. In the fall of 1973 Bejarano and approximately 
four hundred others formed the Unión Popular de Vendedores Ambu-
lantes (Popular Union of Street Vendors, upva). Unlike most Mexican 
unions the upva was independent from the ruling Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (Institutional Revolutionary Party, pri). During the union’s 
height in the mid- 1980s it had some ten thousand members, making the 
upva the largest organization of its kind in Mexico’s province.1
Like their friend Bejarano, Adolfo Corona and his wife, Paula Javier, 
were politically active vendors. In 1974 they participated in the upva’s 
cultural commission, a group that used art to publicize vendors’ strug-
gles. Corona and Javier wanted to demonstrate how local police officers 
repressed vendors, so Corona performed the role of a police officer in a 
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2 Introduction
play the sellers entitled Street Vendors. They believed their play was an 
effective political strategy to express the troubles peddlers met on a daily 
basis. Ideologically the couple was inspired by their close connection to 
young leftist students and by some of their own reading. For years Corona 
and Javier received the Pekín Informa (Peking Review), the Maoist weekly 
magazine published in China and circulated in Mexico in Spanish.2 
Although Javier was illiterate, she enjoyed listening to her husband read 
aloud. Corona liked the magazine because it was attuned to his own 
political ideas and to poor people’s struggle for dignity.
The lives of these three individuals exemplify a slice of the complex eco-
nomic and political conditions that thousands of street vendors in Puebla, 
Mexico’s fourth- largest city, experienced during the last three decades of 
the twentieth century. Street Democracy tells the story of ordinary men 
and women— people like Bejarano, Corona, and Javier— who fought 
against social, economic, and political oppression during the waning of 
the Mexican Miracle and the rise of the neoliberal turn. From the 1940s 
to the 1970s the country witnessed a sustained economic growth— the 
Mexican Miracle— in which the gdp grew 6.2 percent annually.3 After the 
1982 debt crisis, the political elite began implementing neoliberal reforms 
in which the state significantly reduced its expenditure in key areas of the 
economy, promoted market- oriented reforms, sold or closed state- owned 
industries, and drastically modified government policies toward labor.4
By bringing together street vendors’ economic and political histories, 
this book explains how vendors made a living during these turbulent years 
and how they organized politically against the backdrop of increasing 
state authoritarianism. Focusing on the upva offers an opportunity to 
understand an independent union of actors in the informal economy 
that has maintained a grassroots resistance to the pri state for over four 
decades. In a city known for its political and social conservatism, vendors 
found allies among left- wing students. This alliance helped vendors create 
a militant and democratic union. Vendors borrowed from the student 
movement several political strategies they put into practice to defend 
their right to make a living in public spaces. Studying this regional case 
also allows us to expand our understanding of left- wing militant and 
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working- class students. These students did not take up arms and join 
guerrillas, did not become proletarian in an effort to educate workers 
in factories, and did not succumb to co- optation by the pri. Instead 
they continued their activism among actors in the informal economy. In 
short, a group of militant Poblano students took an alternative path of 
resistance by helping vendors organize a pri- independent and militant 
union. The vendor- student alliance also illustrates the role each played in 
building the New Left in the city of Puebla, including their “transnational 
dimension of social and cultural protest” and their “non- armed aspects 
of radical challenges to political and social norms.”5
The union that vendors formed in 1973 allowed the illiterate, the urban 
poor, and recent migrants to take part in the political life of their city 
and country. For vendors democracy meant the right to make a living 
in public spaces such as sidewalks, streets, and markets; the right to 
organize independently from the pri and to publicly dissent from 
authorities. Democracy also meant the right to elect their union leaders, 
participate in daily union activities, learn skills, be elected to union 
positions, and create alternative narratives. In short, organized vendors 
exercised forms of direct democracy and challenged state authoritar-
ianism and its control over Mexico’s unions.6 Street Democracy is the 
first book to discuss the role of informal workers in a broader wave of 
independent labor insurgency that reached its height in the 1970s and 
continues to exist.7
As historians have demonstrated, beginning in the 1940s the pri 
state faced great resistance from groups of rural and urban Mexicans of 
diverse class backgrounds and numerous locations across the country.8 
Puebla’s organized street vendors belong to this history of resistance 
that demystifies the Pax Priísta, the belief that Mexico enjoyed political 
stability thanks to the pri- led government. The upva case demonstrates 
that the pri could not co- opt all unions or avoid cross- sectoral alliances. 
But like many other Mexicans across the country, independently orga-
nized vendors also paid for their defiance. Agents of the state relied on 
a combination of strategies, including negotiation, collaboration, and 
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most often illegal procedures and violence, to try to end dissent; local, 
state, and federal officials also carried out these tactics against vendors 
and their leaders. 9
Through their independent union vendors ultimately were able to sell 
their wares on prime downtown streets and make a living for thirteen 
years, from 1973 to 1986. After 1986, when the local government forced 
them to relocate, vendors secured stalls at newly built municipal mar-
kets. Securing these spots on the streets and at markets allowed them to 
work and make a living during the most acute economic crises of late 
twentieth- century Mexico— no minor victory.
Official and Independent Unions
In order to control organized labor and to build a base of support among 
the working class, the ruling party co- opted, or at least tried to co- opt 
most unions into its ranks. The co- optation of unions and the often 
artificial base of support that the regime created was part of the corpo-
ratist structure of the ruling party.10 Strong efforts to consolidate this 
corporatism happened during the administration of President Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934– 40). In 1938 Cárdenas transformed the Partido Nacio-
nal Revolucionario (National Revolutionary Party) into the Partido 
de la Revolución Mexicana (Party of the Mexican Revolution)— the 
predecessors of the pri— and reorganized it to incorporate unions of 
peasants, industrial workers, and the military into the party’s sectors. 
These sectors were mainly represented by large confederations: the Con-
federación Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Confederation), the 
Confederación de Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Mexican 
Workers, ctm), and, after its creation in 1943, the Confederación Nacio-
nal de Organizaciones Populares (National Confederation of Popular 
Organizations), which also included the organizations of the so- called 
popular classes and the middle class. The military’s official participation 
in its own confederation was relatively brief, from 1938 to 1941.11
The street vendors’ unions were among those that the state incorpo-
rated into the Confederación Nacional de Organizaciones Populares, 
a confederation that included a motley crew of teachers, public- sector 
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employees, intellectuals, women’s associations, lawyers, manufacturers, 
small and medium- size businesses, industrialists and landowners, as well 
as those the state did not recognize as workers and those who did not 
identify as such.12 It also included individual military men who became 
involved in official politics after President Manuel Ávila Camacho dis-
solved the military sector in 1941.13 Once incorporated into the pri— the 
name of the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana since 1946— the party 
rewarded union loyalty with political and economic benefits for union 
leaders and some benefits for the membership.14 In the case of vendors’ 
unions, the party traded their votes and support to pri politicians for 
temporary spaces in commercially attractive locations and offered some 
political posts for vendors’ leaders.15 The co- opted vendors’ unions became, 
at least in theory, one of the pillars of the party’s corporatist structure.
The unions that the ruling party incorporated and co- opted became 
the official unions.16 After 1948 they were also known as charro unions 
because the party often selected leaders called charros (cowboys).17 For 
the most part, charros placated the rank- and- file and guaranteed the 
unions’ loyalty to the pri, to state policies, and to employers.18 Among 
other requirements, affiliation to the party meant that union members 
had to vote for official candidates at the local, state, and federal levels. 
In theory, by inserting these groups into the party’s ranks and allegedly 
neutralizing them, the pri helped facilitate Mexico’s economic growth 
by allowing employers to keep wages low and subdue potential strikes.
Not all workers allowed the party machine to control the political 
life of their organizations. Workers in a variety of industries and in the 
countryside sought to democratize their charro unions from within or 
formed independent unions that refused to be incorporated into the 
pri.19 By doing so they challenged the party corporatist structure. Gen-
erally speaking, independent unions had democratic characteristics and 
were committed to fight for the interests of their members.20 Members 
usually had the freedom and the mechanisms to elect their own leaders, 
who were known individuals within the group. To avoid a monopoly of 
power by one or more individuals, leaders were not supposed to hold 
positions for extended periods of time. Instead elections happened on a 
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regular basis. The independent leadership did not force their members 
to vote for the pri and tended to be more militant. At least in theory, 
members of the independent unions actively and voluntarily partici-
pated in their organizations. They attended meetings and carried out 
protests and strikes. Rank- and- file members also had a say in the union’s 
decision- making process. This participation allowed people to have a 
more thorough knowledge of their unions. In contrast, workers in official 
and “white unions”— the equivalent of “company unions” in the United 
States— sometimes did not even know to which union they belonged, 
what the purpose of the union was, or even who their leaders were.21
Union independence in Mexico has a long and rich history that, 
although not always completely successful, goes back to the revolutionary 
period. Since the 1920s the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana 
(Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers, crom) had a near monop-
oly on organized labor. The first attempts to organize autonomously 
occurred when unions sought to disengage from the crom during the 
1920s and 1930s. In 1921 some unions, influenced by anarchosyndicalist 
groups, joined the Confederación General de Trabajadores (General Con-
federation of Workers), which was committed to maintaining its autonomy 
from the crom and from President Álvaro Obregón’s presidency.22 
In 1933 different labor and peasant unions formed the Confederación 
General de Obreros y Campesinos de México (General Confederation 
of Workers and Peasants of Mexico, cgocm), which promoted state 
independence and union democracy. Three years later a broad range of 
organizations— including the cgocm— merged to become the Confed-
eración de Trabajadores Mexicanos, which, during its early years, tried to 
form broad coalitions of industrial and agricultural laborers. Many unions 
in the ctm became disillusioned when President Cárdenas incorporated 
the ctm into the ruling party in 1938.23 In Puebla, for instance, after the 
1940 presidential elections the Federación Regional de Obreros y Cam-
pesinos (Regional Federation of Workers and Peasants, froc) severed 
its ties with the ctm, remaining “one of the more militant mainstream 
labor federations into the mid-1940s.”24 At the national level large indus-
trial unions in the railroad, oil, and mining and metalworker industries 
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left the ctm and supported the leftist Popular Party in 1948. As a result 
the state countered union dissidence by replacing militant leaders with 
charros.25 Workers, however, continued fighting, so even if charro leaders 
dominated organized labor for decades, they faced much rank- and- file 
resistance. Some charros, however, secured benefits for workers; as a result 
these workers viewed the charros as legitimate leaders.26
Yet in the mid- 1960s and especially in the early 1970s Mexico’s orga-
nized labor witnessed the increasing and rapid emergence of a wave of 
independent unionism that scholars have identified as the “new labor 
insurgency,” whose novelty stemmed from the unions’ rupture with the 
pri.27 More important, at its core the “labor insurgency was mainly a 
democratizing movement.”28 By the end of the 1970s workers in dif-
ferent industries had created approximately one hundred independent 
unions.29 These included unions in the auto, food processing, and garment 
industries, as well as among university faculty and staff.30 Some of these 
independent unions joined umbrella organizations such as the Frente 
Auténtico del Trabajo (Authentic Labor Front), the Unidad Obrera 
Independiente (Independent Workers Union), and the Central Camp-
esina Independiente (Independent Peasant Organization).31
The new labor insurgency was fueled by President Luis Echeverría’s 
democratic opening (1970– 76), in which he tried, for political reasons, 
to distance his administration from the ctm.32 But the rise of inde-
pendent unions did not necessarily emerge from top- down policies, as 
some scholars have suggested.33 While Echeverría’s democratic opening 
facilitated the conditions for independent unions to multiply, it cannot 
fully explain why workers chose these kinds of organizations. As Michael 
Snodgrass has noted, changes in industrial relations resulted in new pro-
duction methods that negatively affected workers. In turn, they resisted 
their bosses by organizing independent unions or by working to form 
democratic currents within official unions.34
Street Democracy demonstrates that militant and democratic unions 
originated not only on shop floors and in the fields but also on the 
streets. The upva’s case shows that the labor insurgency of the 1970s 
emerged from the bottom up and included members of the informal 
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sector. Street vendors did not have employers who pressured them to 
increase production while keeping wages low. Their independent unionism 
developed out of a new sociopolitical context on the streets of Puebla. 
The harsh conditions that vendors experienced and the support of mil-
itant left- wing students at Puebla’s Autonomous State University fueled 
the organization of the upva. The emergence of the vendors’ union 
also occurred as Puebla’s political elite, the avilacamachistas, faced a 
rupture with the federal government.35 By the early 1970s the political 
context in the streets of Puebla was ripe for vendors to organize an 
independent union.
Challenges to the State
Independent unions presented several challenges to the state, to official 
union leaders, and to employers. By striking and demanding higher wages 
and better working and housing conditions, independent unions posed an 
economic threat to the state. Since upva members did not have employers 
and could not strike, their main challenge occurred in the political sphere. 
Vendors used public spaces to march, protest, perform theater, read, and 
discuss ideas, offering alternatives to more traditional forms of political 
action. For instance, when vendors took to the streets to protest, they 
were making themselves visible and were publicly drawing attention to 
their problems.36 This represented a challenge for the pri state, which 
claimed to support the interests of ordinary people.
Vendors also publicly protested the clientelistic structure of the state. 
In the past, as the political sociologist Leonardo Avritzer points out, 
“material improvements for ordinary citizens represent[ed] favors to 
be delivered by elite political mediators.”37 Indeed from the moment 
vendors formed unions, members relied on the will of official leaders to 
achieve their demands. In the case of the upva, its independence allowed 
vendors to negotiate directly with authorities. They did so by organiz-
ing in political commissions, marching on the most important avenues, 
occupying the streets surrounding the municipal palace, and entering in 
direct dialogue with municipal and state authorities. Vendors did not 
need official union leaders to achieve their goals in exchange for their 
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political support of the ruling party. In this way vendors’ use of public 
space forced authorities to engage in a political dialogue with them.
Since the upva did not make their members vote for ruling party 
politicians, the pri faced the possibility that organized vendors might sup-
port oppositional parties such as the Partido Acción Nacional (National 
Action Party, pan) or, later, the Partido de la Revolución Democrática 
(Party of the Democratic Revolution). The pri also lost its ability to use 
independent union members as acarreados, people dragged to rallies, 
auditoriums, and stadiums during campaigns to give the impression that 
pri politicians enjoyed broad popular support.38 Last, the party could not 
use independent unionists, like upva vendors, to attack political enemies. 
For instance, when a pan mayor won Puebla city’s elections in 1996, the 
pri governor at the time sent pri- affiliated street vendors to set up their 
stalls in downtown streets to create an image of disorder that the pan 
mayor was allegedly unable to resolve.39 In this situation official union 
members acted as pawns of the state governor; upva members did not.
Moreover Puebla’s independently organized vendors created alliances 
with different groups in society, an act that defied one of the supposed 
tenets of corporatism: maintaining the different sectors of the pri within 
the party but apart from each other.40 Thus the pri tried to avoid cross- 
sectoral alliances. But as historians have demonstrated, workers, peasants, 
students, and middle- class groups formed alliances with one another that 
showed the limitations of the party.41 By not affiliating with the pri, the 
upva was also free to create cross- sectoral alliances. These relationships 
led to the creation of fronts, which had the potential of promoting polit-
ical change in Mexico. Over the decades vendors joined some of these 
organizations. In the early 1970s, for instance, they participated in the 
Frente de Activistas Emiliano Zapata (Emiliano Zapata Activists Front) 
with students and in the Frente de Autodefensa del Pueblo (People’s Self- 
Defense Front), which included tenants, peasants, vendors, and students.42
Losses
Choosing union independence was a bold move for street vendors in 
the authoritarian regime of the Mexican state. Independence resulted in 
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several political and material losses to the unions. Not surprisingly the 
ruling party gave more material and political concessions and rewards 
to official unions than to independent organizations. For instance, inde-
pendent unions did not receive money or subsidies from the state for 
daily operations.43 Under these circumstances the upva leadership had 
to rely exclusively on member fees for all expenses. A more dangerous 
consequence for independent leaders and members was their vulnerability 
to repression by local, state, and federal authorities. Therefore a second 
theme of Street Democracy is state repression. Although the state’s tolerance 
of independent unions was an important characteristic of President Ech-
everría’s democratic opening, if these organizations became too militant 
the state crushed them with the same violence that had characterized 
previous administrations. In fact all forms of state violence became a 
large component of the street vendor experience. Even before vendors 
organized their union in the fall of 1973, police beat vendors, seizing their 
merchandise and destroying their stalls, and detaining them for hours or 
even days. Worse still, police sometimes jailed men and women together 
with their young children.
Once vendors organized the upva, they went from being a local 
problem to a concern of the state and federal governments. It was then 
that local, state, and federal authorities struck back. The federals spied 
on the organization, while local and state governments employed legal 
and illegal mechanisms to incarcerate their leaders, torturing some of 
them in order to neutralize the power of the union. In Puebla the state 
used violence alongside the rhetoric of historical heritage preservation, 
which provided an effective strategy to mask its authoritarianism during 
the neoliberal turn. Referring to neoliberal cities around the world, the 
urban geographer David Harvey correctly asserts that “violence is required 
to build the new urban world on the wreckage of the old.”44 This book 
shows that such violence and intimidation have not ceased.
Neoliberalism
By the mid- 1980s, as Mexico entered its neoliberal phase, the state used 
new strategies, in addition to physical violence, to destroy activists and 
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their independent or militant organizations, while at the same time trying 
not to appear authoritarian. A third theme in Street Democracy is Mex-
ico’s engagement with neoliberal policies, specifically the redefinition 
of the use of public space and the fierce fight against unions. The state 
presented itself as a defender of urban order and capitalist modernization 
and violently punished those who, like street vendors, appeared to disrupt 
it. As a supporter of modernization the state selectively encouraged the 
efforts of some social groups to move forward economically. Following 
a centuries- long tradition, local and state authorities regulated what they 
considered the appropriate use of public space and, with the neoliberal 
turn, fully privileged the projects of the upper and middle classes over 
those of the urban poor and the working class. I trace the transformation 
of public space from a relatively community- oriented and working- class 
space to a neoliberal space where large capital dominated. With the aid 
of business leaders, local and state governments devised a more effective 
strategy that could finally solve the problem of street vending— and 
eliminate the upva in the process— all while authorities appeared to 
defend and protect Puebla’s historical heritage. In the mid- 1980s several 
state agencies petitioned the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (unesco) to include Puebla’s downtown 
on the World Heritage Site list.45 As part of this petition, these groups 
committed to “rescue” and “dignify” the downtown area before and after 
Puebla’s inclusion.46
In 1986 municipal authorities supported by business groups began to 
remove street vendors from the so- called historic downtown to the new 
markets in the outskirts of the city. In connivance with state authorities, 
economic elites closed La Victoria market and, years later, transformed 
it into a shopping mall that housed, among others, two Walmart- owned 
retailers. Once more Harvey is correct: “The right to the city, as it is now 
constituted, is too narrowly confined, restricted in most cases to a small 
political and economic elite who are in a position to shape cities more 
and more after their own desires.”47 In this context it is not surprising 
that vendors of fruits and knickknacks like Bejarano, Javier, and Corona 
practically disappeared from the streets at the heart of the neoliberal city.
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